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Hard Times, Hard Time:
Retributive Justice for
Unjustly Disadvantaged Offenders
Stuart P. Greent

Criminological studies consistently indicate that a disproportionate percentage of crime in our society-both violent and
nonviolent-is committed by those who are poor and socially disadvantaged. If we assume that at least some people who commit
crimes fail to get from society what they "deserve" in terms of
economic, political, or social rights, the question arises whether
their disadvantage should affect what such people "deserve" as
punishment for their crimes. The question is all the more pressing given recent Census Bureau figures indicating that the economic recession that began in 2008 has resulted in a higher percentage of residents living below the poverty line than at any
point since 1997,1 with figures for 2009 certain to be even higher
given rising unemployment rates.
Most scholars who have been concerned with this issue have
assumed that there is one set of principles that will explain the
proper relationship between distributive and retributive justice.
The fact that an offender has been denied the basic entitlements
of a just society, however defined, is taken to have implications
for criminal liability across the board, regardless of the offense
2
charged.
t Professor of Law and Justice Nathan L. Jacobs Scholar, Rutgers School of LawNewark. This Article draws heavily on a chapter that will appear in the forthcoming
collection, PhilosophicalFoundations of Criminal Law (R.A. Duff and Stuart P. Green,
eds), and I am grateful to Oxford University Press for permission to reprint portions of
that chapter here. Helpful comments and questions were received from fellow symposiasts at the University of Chicago Law School, the University of Warsaw Faculty of Law,
and Rutgers School of Law-Newark. Special thanks to Kim Ferzan and Jae Lee for their
insights.
I Carmen DeNavas-Walt, Bernadette D. Proctor, and Jessica C. Smith, US Census
Bureau, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2008 13
(US Government Printing Office 2009), online at http//www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/
p60-236.pdf (visited Oct 4, 2010).
2 See, for example, Stephen R. Perry, The Relationship between Corrective and Distributive Justice, in Jeremy Horder, ed, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence:Fourth Series
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The argument to be developed here suggests that a proper
analysis of the relationship between distributive and retributive
justice should proceed on a case-by-case basis. Such an analysis
would take account of three distinct factors. First, it would look
to the specific kind of offense with which the offender is charged.
The fact that an offender is deeply and unjustly disadvantaged
might be relevant to determining his blameworthiness for committing one kind of criminal offense (say, an offense against the
person) but not another (say, an offense against property or
against the administration of justice). Under this approach, we
would need to consider what makes an offender blameworthy for
committing a particular kind of offense in the first place, and
then ask whether and how his disadvantage affects such blameworthiness. Second, we would need to look at the precise form
that the offender's disadvantage takes. The fact that an offender
has been denied any reasonable opportunity to obtain property,
for example, might be relevant to determining his blameworthiness for committing a particular kind of offense in a way that his
being denied the opportunity to participate in the political process or the right to certain kinds of basic police protection by the
state might not. Third, we would need to consider the economic
and social circumstances of the crime victim (assuming there is
an identifiable victim). For example, a criminal act directed by a
disadvantaged offender at a similarly disadvantaged victim
might be blameworthy in a way that the same crime directed at a
privileged member of the political or economic elite would not.
I. THE RECESSION, POVERTY, CRIME, AND INJUSTICE

A.

The Recession and Poverty

The recession that began in 2008 has been particularly hard
on the poor. Household income in the US among all groups
declined during 2008, but more sharply for the poor than for the
wealthy and middle class. According to Census Bureau statistics,
there were 39.8 million people living in poverty in the United
States during 2008, up from 37.3 million the year before. 3 This
(Oxford 2000); Wojciech Sadurski, DistributiveJustice and the Theory of Punishment, 5
Oxford J Legal Stud 47, 58-59 (1985); Saul Smilansky, Control, Desert and the Difference
Between Distributiveand Retributive Justice, 131 Philosophical Stud 511, 513-14 (2006).
3 DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance at 13
(cited in note 1). Social scientists have traditionally distinguished between two different
senses of poverty-"absolute" and "relative." See generally Amartya Sen, Poor, Relatively
Speaking, 35 Oxford Econ Papers 153 (1983). Absolute poverty measures the number of
people living below a certain income threshold (the "poverty line"), who thereby lack the
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represents a poverty rate of 13.2 percent in 2008, up from 12.5
percent in 2007 and the highest rate since 1997. 4 The number of
families living in poverty also increased in 2008, to 8.1 million
from 7.6 million in 2007, as did the percentage of families living
in poverty, to 10.3 percent from 9.8 percent the year before. 5 In
addition, according to US Department of Agriculture figures, the
number of Americans who lived in households that lacked
consistent access to adequate food during 2008 was at the highest level since the government began tracking what it calls "food
insecurity" in 1995.6 And poverty and food insecurity rates were
resources to meet the basic needs for healthy living. See European Anti-Poverty Network,
Poverty and Inequality in the European Union, online at http;//www.poverty.org.uk/
summary/eapn.shtml (visited Oct 4, 2010). In theory, the measure of absolute poverty is
independent of country, culture, and technological sophistication. Relative poverty, by
contrast, has been defined as the inability of citizens to fully participate in economic
terms in the society in which they live. Id. It measures the extent to which a household's
financial resources fall below an average income threshold for the relevant economy. Id.
Under this approach, people are said to be living in poverty if "their income and resources
are so inadequate as to preclude them from having a standard of living considered acceptable in the society in which they live." Council of the European Union, Joint Report
by the Commission and the Council on Social Inclusion 8 (2004), online at http;//ec.
europa.eu/employmentsociaVsoc-prot/soc-incVffmaljointinclusionreport_2003_en.pdf
(visited Oct 4, 2010).
Since the 1960s, the US government has defined poverty in absolute terms. See US
Census Bureau, How the Census Bureau Measures Poverty, online at http//www.census.
gov/hhes/www/poverty/about/overview/measure.html (visited Oct 4, 2010). In the United
States, the rate of absolute poverty is fairly low, given the high standard of living compared to other countries. See Stephanie Moller, et al, Determinants of Relative Poverty in
Advanced Capitalist Democracies, 68 Amer Sociological Rev 22, 23-24 (2003). But the
rate of relative poverty is quite high, id at 36, given the relatively high median income
and high degree of income inequality. Determining the poverty threshold depends on the
size of the household in which a person lives. For example, in 2008, the poverty threshold
for a single person under the age of sixty-five was $11,201 in income. US Census Bureau,
Poverty Thresholds for 2008 by Size of Family and Number of Related Children Under 18
Years, online at httpV/www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/threshld/threshld09.html
(visited Oct 4, 2010). For a family of four with two children, the figure was $21,834. Id.
Each person living in such a household will be counted as living in poverty. US Census
Bureau, How the Census Bureau Measures Poverty. The Department of Health and Human Services issues separate poverty guidelines for determining who is eligible for various federal programs such as food stamps, the national school-lunch program, legal services for the poor, Head Start, and the like.
In the European Union, by contrast, poverty is defined in relative terms. European
Anti-Poverty Network, Poverty and Inequality in the European Union, online at httpi//
www.poverty.org.uk/summary/eapn.shtml (visited Oct 4, 2010). Year 2005 EU data show
that about 78 million people, or 16 percent of the population, were in poverty or at risk of
poverty, though there was considerable variance among member states. Id.
4 DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage at 13 (cited in note 1).
5 Id at 16.
6 See Mark Nord, Margaret Andrews, and Steven Carlson, US Department of Agriculture Economic Research Services, Household Food Security in the United States, 2008,
Economic Research Report No 83, 8, online at http//www.ers.usda.gov/Publications/
Err83/ (visited Oct 4, 2010). The figure was 49.1 million Americans, an increase of ap-
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expected to be even higher in 2009 as a result of the far higher
7
rate of unemployment than in 2008.
Looking abroad, the effects of the recession have been at
least as dramatic. A recent report from the office of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon estimates that up to 90 million additional people have been pushed into poverty as a result of the
global economic recession, 8 the effects of which have been felt in
Europe and Africa, as well as in Asia, where more than 60 million people live below the $1.25 a day absolute poverty line. 9
B.

Poverty and Crime

Why should criminal law theorists be concerned with the
problem of poverty and other forms of disadvantage, whatever
their source? One reason is that the poor account for a disproportionately high percentage of crime victims. According to US
Department of Justice figures, during 2006 the annual rate of
victimization for all crimes, both violent and nonviolent, per
1,000 persons with incomes of less than $7,500 was 64.6, compared to 45.9 for persons with incomes between $7,500 and
$14,999, 31.4 for incomes between $15,000 and $24,999, 34.5 for
incomes between $25,000 and $34,999, 22.5 for incomes between
$35,000 and $49,999, 24.5 for incomes between $50,000 and
$74,999, and 14.6 for incomes over $75,000.10 Thus, the deeper
the recession and the higher the rate of poverty, the greater the
number of people, at least at the low end of the scale, likely to be
victims of crime, and the more harmful such crime is likely to be.
proximately 13 million over the year before. Id at 6. About a third of these struggling
households had what was referred to as "very low food security," meaning that family
members were forced to skip meals or otherwise forgo food at some point in the year. Id
at 4-5.
7 See Erik Eckholm, Last Year's Poverty Rate Was Highest in 12 Years, NY Times
A12 (Sept 11, 2009).
8 Recession Pushed 90 Million into Extreme Poverty-UN, Reuters (July 6, 2009),
online at httpV/www.alertnet.org/thenewWnewsdesk/L2892172.htm (visited Oct 4, 2010).
9 Craig Kielburger and Marc Kielburger, U.S.-Born Crisis Hits Africa Hard,
thestar.com, online at http //www.thestar.com7News/GlobalVoices/article/600493 (visited
Oct 4, 2010); 60 Million Asians below Poverty Line Due to Recession, Thaindian News
(June 22, 2009), online at http/www.thaindian.com/newsportal/business/60-mn-asiansbelow-poverty-line-due-to-recession-official_100207983.html#ixzz0T4fvSiP9 (visited Oct
4, 2010). See generally Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are
Failingand What Can Be Done about It (Oxford 2007).
10 US Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States 2009, Table 305,
online at httpV/www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/09statab/law.pdf (visited Oct 4, 2010).
During 2006, the burglary rate for those with a household annual income of less than
$7,500 was 55.7 per 1,000 households, while the rate for those with a household annual
income of $75,000 or more was 22.4 per 1,000. Id at Table 309.
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A second reason is that the poor and disadvantaged account
for a disproportionately high percentage of criminal offenders.
While the Department of Justice does not tabulate arrest or conviction rates by class or income (instead, it does so for interrelated factors such as race, sex, age, and geographic area), there
are a number of scholarly studies which suggest that, the lower
one's income, the more likely one is to engage in criminal activity, whether violent or nonviolent.1 1 (This is hardly to imply, of
course, that all or even a particularly significant percentage of
impoverished people commit crime, or that well-to-do people do
not also commit crimes.)
Whether a direct connection can be drawn between economic
recession and higher rates of offending is another question. From
an a priori perspective, it seems reasonable to suppose that people are more likely to engage in crime when: (1) they lack a
steady source of legitimate income, (2) they have time on their
hands to engage in criminal activity, and (3) the state reduces
expenditures for policing and social services. 12 From an empirical
perspective, however, proving a link between economic recession
and increases in crime has proved difficult. 13 There are complicated questions about both the appropriate way to measure economic recession and the best way to measure the crime rate. 14
And there are numerous factors other than the economy that affect crime rates, such as evolving norms, changes in
11 For a discussion of these studies, see Richard H. McAdams, Economic Costs of
Inequality, 2010 U Chi Legal F 23. See, for example, Bruce Western, Punishment and
Inequality in America 34-51 (Russell Sage 2006); John Hagan and Ruth D. Peterson,
Criminal Inequality in America: Patternsand Consequences, in John Hagan and Ruth D.
Peterson, eds, Crime and Inequality 19-22 (Stanford 1995); Roy M. Howsen and Stephen
B. Jarrell, Some Determinants of Property Crime: Economic Factors Influence Criminal
Behavior but Cannot Completely Explain the Syndrome, 46 Am J Econ & Soc 445, 454
(1987); Eckart Kdihlhorn, Victims and Offenders of Criminal Violence, 6 J Qualitative
Criminology 51, 55 (1990).
12 See generally Theodore G. Chiricos, Rates of Crime and Unemployment: An Analysis of Aggregate Research Evidence, 34 Soc Probs 187 (1987); Jeffrey Fagan and Richard
B. Freeman, Crime and Work, 25 Crime and Justice 225 (1999).
13 See Barry Krisberg, Carolina Guzman, and Lynn Vuong, National Council on
Crime and Delinquency, Crime and Economic Hard Times 1 (2009), online at
httpV/www.nccd-crc.org/nccd/pubs/2009_special-reportcrimeeconomy.pdf (visited Oct 4,
2010).
14 See The National Bureau of Economic Research, US Business Cycle Expansions
and Contractions, online at http;//www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html (visited Oct 4,
2010). Economic downturns can be measured in terms of gross domestic product, real
income, unemployment, industrial production, or wholesale and retail sales. Id. In measuring crime rates, one might look to factors such as crimes reported, arrests made, convictions obtained, and inmates incarcerated. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, US Department of Justice, Crime Trends from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports (2008), online at
http;//bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/Search/Crime/Crime.cfm (visited Oct 4, 2010).
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demographics, trends in policing methods, and prosecutorial and
sentencing practices.
C.

Poverty and Injustice

There is yet another reason why criminal law scholars
should be concerned with the problem of poverty and disadvantage, and that is the one I am mainly concerned with here:
the possibility that an offender's impoverishment or other form of
disadvantage might bear on his blameworthiness in committing
his offense. Whether this is the case would seem to turn, in the
first instance, on whether the offender's poverty or disadvantage
is itself unjust. A person might be impoverished for any number
of reasons other than systemic injustice: for example, she might
be indolent, reckless, or merely unlucky. When we talk about
desert in the context of distributive justice, we refer to the fair
distribution of burdens and benefits among the members of a
given society. 15 In order to say whether a person's impoverishment is truly unfair or unjust, we need an underlying theory that
explains what people are entitled to in terms of wealth and opportunity, and exactly how such entitlements arise. Such a theory would consider, for example, whether society is obligated to:
(1) provide for the basic public safety of all its members
(whether citizens or mere residents), 16 including basic police protections;
(2) create conditions which make it possible for its members to have an opportunity for a decent life, including
conditions that make it possible for members to earn a living, and to obtain healthy food, medical care, adequate
shelter, and an education;
(3) provide members with the opportunity to participate
in the political process, enjoy certain basic human rights,
such as freedoms of speech, conscience, assembly, privacy,
and the like; and to resolve disputes, and obtain legal process; and

15 William C. Heffernan, Social Justice/CriminalJustice, in William C. Heffernan
and John Kleinig, eds, From Social Justice to CriminalJustice47, 49 (Oxford 2000).
16 There is an interesting question, though not one that I shall pursue here, concerning the extent to which societies have an obligation to extend to noncitizen residents and
to aliens the rights that they extend to their citizens. See generally Seyla Benhabib, The
Rights of Others:Aliens, Residents, and Citizens (Cambridge 2004).
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(4) impose demands on members, such as the obligation
to pay taxes and serve in the military, according to some
17
principle of fair distribution.
To what extent society has an obligation to provide in this
way for its members, and where such obligation comes from, are
obviously among the most complex and contested questions in all
of normative political theory.' 8 Indeed, the nature of such obligation involves one of the most contested set of issues in our political discourse as well. To try to resolve these issues here would
lead us well beyond the scope of this Article. Moreover, even if we
could agree about what constitutes distributive injustice in the
abstract, we would face additional problems in trying to decide if
and when a given society qualifies as unjust, or, more precisely,
exactly who in a given society should be regarded as unjustly
deprived of the basic opportunities that they deserve.
Later on, I will offer a means of sidestepping these problems.
Rather than try to develop a theory of what constitutes social
injustice, I will simply stipulate a set of scenarios that almost
everyone, I assume, would regard as unjust. Beginning with
these scenarios, we will then trace the implications of distributive injustice for the assignment of retributive blame.
II. PRIOR A'rEMTS TO ASSESS THE EFFECT OF
IMPOVERISHMENT AND DISADVANTAGE ON AN
OFFENDER'S BLAMEWORTHINESS FOR CRIME

In this Section, I consider four approaches previously developed for addressing the possible normative effect of an offender's
poverty or other form of disadvantage on her blameworthiness
and liability for criminal conduct. I shall refer to these approaches, respectively, as (1) necessity, (2) excuse, (3) broken social contract, and (4) nonjusticiability.

17 Here, I loosely follow an approach suggested in Heffernan, Social Justice/Criminal
Justice at 50-51 (cited in note 15) (discussing versions of social justice and the associated
obligations of society to its members).
18 For helpful surveys, see Serge-Christophe Kolm, DistributiveJustice,in Robert E.
Goodin and Philip Pettit, eds, A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy
(Blackwell 1993); Julian Lamont and Christi Favor, Distributive Justice, in Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, online at http/plato.stanford.edu/entries/ustice-distributive/
(visited Oct 4, 2010).
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Necessity

Under current Anglo-American law, the most plausible argument an impoverished defendant could make for avoiding liability for at least some crimes is one based on the idea of necessity. Under the standard common law formulation, the defendant
must show that: (1) she was faced with a clear and imminent
danger of harm or serious bodily injury; (2) she reasonably believed her action would be effective in abating the danger that
she sought to avoid; (3) there was no effective legal way to avert
the harm; (4) the harm caused by her criminal act was less serious than that sought to be avoided; and (5) she is not to blame for
creating the emergency conditions in which she finds herself. 19 A
defendant who asserts a necessity defense argues that even
though she did in fact commit all of the requisite acts, she nonetheless did nothing morally wrong. This is so because the crime's
definition of prohibited conduct is, in a sense, incomplete. 20 Contemporary law permits what the crime as defined otherwise prohibits where circumstances make her action the right (or at least
not the wrong) thing to do.
The applicability of the necessity defense depends entirely
on the nature of the offense committed and the circumstances
that occasioned its commission. 21 One who committed trespass or
theft because she otherwise would have suffered the effects of
hunger or exposure can argue, at least in theory, that her conduct was justified under the defense of necessity. By contrast,
one who committed rape or murder or assault as a result of her
impoverishment would almost invariably be unable to establish a
defense of necessity, because her action (1) would not be effective
in abating the danger she sought to avoid, and (2) even if it was
(say, if she killed V to get the loaf of bread he was holding), the
harm caused by the criminal act would be no less serious than
that sought to be avoided.
In practice, even a starving or homeless person charged with
theft or trespass will have a hard time establishing a necessity
defense if the prosecution can show that: (1) she would not have
19 See, for example, Joshua Dressier, Understanding Criminal Law 291-93
(LexisNexis 5th ed 2009).
20 The idea of "incompleteness" in this context is suggested by Sanford H. Kadish,
Excusing Crime, 75 Cal L Rev 257, 258 (1987).
21 See Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 3.02 at 9-10 ("A speed limit may be
violated in pursuing a suspected criminal. An ambulance may pass a traffic light .... A
druggist may dispense a drug without the requisite prescription to alleviate grave distress in an emergency.").
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suffered any serious injury if she had not committed the crime;
(2) there were legal alternatives available to her, such as attending a soup kitchen or homeless shelter; or (3) she somehow bore
responsibility for the impoverished situation in which she found
herself. Presumably as a result of these stringent requirements,
reported cases in which a defendant charged with theft or trespass was acquitted by virtue of the necessity defense are virtual22
ly nonexistent, at least in modern times.
Still, the defense exists in theory and it is worth saying how
it differs from the problem with which this Article is specifically
concerned. The first point is simply that the necessity defense is
only loosely correlated with poverty and other forms of chronic
disadvantage. Poverty, in the systemic sense described above, is
neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for the application
of the necessity defense. No matter how impoverished a person
might be, she will not be eligible for the defense unless it can be
shown that at the moment of her crime her death or injury was
imminent and unavoidable. If she could find temporary sustenance by, say, attending a soup kitchen, then she is unlikely to
be able to claim the defense. By the same token, a hiker stranded
in the wilderness in a snow storm has the privilege to commit
trespass and theft if doing so will prevent death or serious bodily
injury. The fact that she has millions in the bank back home is
irrelevant; the only thing that counts is her immediate circumstances at the moment she commits her offense. More generally,
23
the defense of necessity functions (though at times uneasily)
within the settled confines of the criminal law. It does not question the basic justice of how property rights are distributed. Nor
does it question the basic integrity of theft law. Indeed, to the
extent that lawmakers have anticipated a given choice of evils
and "determined the balance to be struck between.., competing
22 The history of the necessity defense is a particularly convoluted one. In the famous
"lifeboat" case of Queen v Dudley & Stephens, 14 QBD 273, 283 (1884), the court accepted
as a given Matthew Hale's statement that it was not the law of England that a starving
man could be justified in stealing a loaf of bread. Prior to Hale's time (1609-1676), however, English law was apparently more receptive to economic necessity as a defense to
theft. See generally Dana Y. Rabin, Identity, Crime, and Legal Responsibility in Eighteenth-Century England 86-89 (Palgrave 2004). For an account of how medieval European
law dealt with the question of poverty, see Brian Tierney, Medieval Poor Law: A Sketch of
Canonical Theory and Its Application in England (Regents of the University of California
1959). Rabbinic law also permits one to commit crimes such as theft in order to preserve
life. See The Babylonian Talmud. Seder Mo'ed: Yoma 83b (The Soncino Press 1938) (Rabbi Dr. Leo Jung trans).
23 See John T. Parry, The Virtue of Necessity: Reshaping Culpability and the Rule of
Law, 36 Houston L Rev 397, 403-04 (1999) (noting "anxiety" regularly felt by courts
applying the necessity defense).
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values" in a manner that conflicts with the defendant's choice,
24
the defense would be unavailable.
B.

Excuse of "Rotten Social Background"

A second way in which the criminal law might respond to
the problem of the impoverished or otherwise disadvantaged offender is that such deprivation might constitute, or provide the
basis for, an excuse defense. Whereas justification defenses consist of arguments that the defendant's conduct was not harmful
or wrongful, excuse defenses focus on the culpability of the actor
himself. Thus, to say that a given criminal act is excused is not to
say that the offender's act was not wrong (in the sense that a justified act is not wrong), but rather that he should not be held fully responsible for his conduct and should either be exempt from
25
punishment entirely or have his punishment mitigated.
Judge David Bazelon, who had previously crafted a significant expansion of the insanity defense, 26 was one of the first to
write about the possibility that a background of extreme poverty
might serve to relieve a criminal defendant of liability. In United
States v Alexander,27 one of the defendants had shot and killed a
victim who had called him a "black bastard."28 The defendant,
who was not mentally ill according to the recognized diagnostic
categories, nevertheless wanted to present evidence that his conduct was the result of an "emotional illness," which in turn was
the product of a socially and economically deprived childhood
growing up in the Watts section of Los Angeles. 29 The trial judge
instructed the jury to disregard the evidence regarding the
defendant's so-called "rotten social background" ("RSB"), and the
court of appeals affirmed the conviction. 30 Judge Bazelon wrote
separately, laying out his views on the possibility of an RSB
defense: "Because of his early conditioning," Bazelon suggested,
24 State v Tate, 505 A2d 941, 946 (NJ 1986). See also Model Penal Code § 3.02(1)(c).
25 See generally Jeremy Horder, Excusing Crime (Oxford 2004).
26 Most famously in Durham v United States, 214 F2d 862, 874-76 (DC Cir 1954)
(stating a new rule that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was
the product of mental disease or mental defect).
27 471 F2d 923 (DC Cir 1973) (Bazelon concurring in part, dissenting in part).
28 Id at 957.

29 Id at 957-58 (relying on a psychiatrist's testimony, the defendant argued that the
compulsiveness of his behavior was closely tied to his sense of racial oppression and he
was suffering from an abnormal mental condition that substantially impaired his behavior controls).
30 Alexander, 471 F2d at 959-60 (observing that this defense was not clearly grounded on any medically recognized mental disease or defect).
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the defendant may well have been "denied any meaningful choice
when the racial insult triggered" his reaction. 3 1 It was possible,
he wrote, that the defendant's underprivileged childhood had
impaired his "mental or emotional processes and behavior controls, rul[ing] his violent reaction in the same manner that the
behavior of a paranoid schizophrenic may be ruled by his 'mental
32
condition."
The idea that an RSB might provide a criminal law defense
was subsequently developed by Richard Delgado. 3 3 Relying on
empirical data establishing a correlation between criminal behavior, on the one hand, and poverty, unemployment, substandard living conditions, inadequate schools, a climate of vio34
lence, inadequate family structure, and racism, on the other,
Delgado argued that courts should recognize a novel excuse defense based on extreme poverty and social deprivation.36 In particular, Delgado offered the possibility that a person's RSB might
cause various behavioral disabilities which in turn might constitute various excusing conditions such as that the actor's conduct was not the product of his voluntary effort, that he did not
accurately perceive the nature or consequences of his act, that he
did not see his conduct as wrongful, or that he did not have the
ability to control his conduct. 36 The defense envisioned by
Delgado is one that is closely analogous to defenses such as
battered-woman syndrome.3 7 According to Delgado,
a review of medical and social science literature show[s]
that life in a violent, overcrowded, stress-filled neighborhood can induce a state in which a resident reacts to certain stimuli with automatic aggression. Some defendants
should be able to prove that they lived under such condi-

31 Id at 960.

32 Id. Bazelon subsequently elaborated on his views in a law review exchange with
Stephen Morse. See David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the CriminalLaw, 49 S Cal L Rev
385, 387-98 (1976); Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Reply to
Judge Bazelon, 49 S Cal L Rev 1247 (1976); David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law: A Rejoinder to ProfessorMorse, 49 S Cal L Rev 1269 (1976).
33 Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background": Should the Criminal Law Recognize
a Defense of Severe EnvironmentalDeprivation? 3 Law and Ineq 9 (1985).
34 Id at 23-34.
35 Id at 54-79.
36 Id at 63-64.

37 Delgado, 3 Law and Ineq at 85 (cited in note 33) (noting that involuntary rage
model is arguably consistent with current views of criminal responsibility).
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tions and that these conditions were causally connected to
38
the crimes charged.
There are a few points to note about the RSB approach.
First, as in the case of the necessity defense, Bazelon and Delgado's defense is developed from within the existing structure of
criminal law. It does not challenge the basic framework of the
law or the legitimacy of our institutions of punishment. Instead,
Bazelon and Delgado argue for an expansion of available excuse
defenses. Second, unlike the necessity approach, the RSB approach makes no distinction based on the nature of the crime
committed; it would apply not only to theft and other property
crimes but also to a wide range of violent crimes (indeed, given
the facts of Alexander, it seems to have been conceived expressly
with violent crimes in mind). Third, the RSB defense would recognize no distinction based on the circumstances of the victim of
the crime; it would presumably be available even when the victim came from the same deprived background as the defendant.
C.

Broken Social Contract

A third approach to the problem of the impoverished defendant looks at criminal punishment from the perspective of the
social-contract theory. 39 The argument consists of three basic
steps. The first is to assert, or intuit, that our legal system exists
within a social contract. Under such a contract, citizens agree (or
would agree in a hypothetical original position) 40 to abide by the
rules of the system in return for the security and predictability
that such rules bring. Since war and disorder threaten to make
everyone's life nasty, brutish, and short (in Hobbes' memorable
phrase), it is reasonable from each person's self-interested
standpoint to accept the authority of a sovereign ruler who will
enforce rules, protect property, and make life generally safe. As
Jeffrie Murphy has put it, "since [the citizen] derives and voluntarily accepts benefits from their operation, he owes his own obedience as a debt to his fellow-citizens for their sacrifices in main41
taining them."

38 Id at 85-86.
3' A leading example is Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 Phil & Pub
Aff 217, 224-31 (1973).
40 The locus classicus for such an approach is John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 17-22
(Harvard 1971).
"' Murphy, 2 Phil & Pub Aff at 228 (cited in note 39).
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Second, when people fail to abide by the rules of the system
and accept the benefits that the system brings without reciprocating, they gain an unfair advantage. Criminal punishment is
said to be a means of restoring the equilibrium of benefits and
burdens by taking from the individual what he owes. 42 If a citizen "chooses not to sacrifice by exercising self-restraint and obedience, this is," again in Murphy's language, "tantamount to his
choosing to sacrifice in another way-namely, by paying the prescribed penalty." 43 In other words, part of the social contract consists of citizens agreeing to be punished if they break the rules.
The third step of the argument requires us to consider what
it would mean to live in a society that is unjust. Under the socialcontract theory, we judge the justness of laws by asking whether
it would be reasonable for people to agree to them in light of
their self-interest. But if the social arrangement is not one that
would be reached behind a hypothetical veil of ignorance, the
obligation to abide by the rules of the system cannot exist. If the
state and its citizenry fail to uphold their end of the bargain,
then the law ceases to be binding; it loses its moral authority.
Citizens emerge, in Murphy's neo-Marxist term, "alienated" from
44
their fellow citizens and the government.
And what are the implications of such breach in the context
of criminal justice? Criminal justice can be thought of as a twoway street. Where society has breached its obligation to its citizens, say, by distributing property in an unjust manner, those
citizens no longer have a duty to comply with the law. And where
citizens no longer have a duty to comply, society no longer has a
right to punish for lack of compliance. Indeed, if there is no moral obligation to obey the law, it would be unjust to use the power
of the state to impose criminal penalties on those who fail to obey
the law.
That, in any event, is the theory. There are, however, a
number of potential problems that should be noted. First, the
theory rests on what Okeoghene Odudu has called a "grotesque
conception of crime." 45 The social contractarians assume that
while we all desire to engage in various forms of criminal activi42 For a well-known formulation of the punishment-as-equilibrium-restorer argument, see Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 The Monist 475, 478 (1968).
43 Murphy, 2 Phil & Pub Aff at 228 (cited in note 39).
44 See id at 231-243 (describing that in the absence of reciprocity moral relations
among men will break down, alienating men from their fellow man, and criminality will

increase).
45 Okeoghene Odudu, Retributivist Justice in an Unjust Society, 16 Ratio Juris 416,

419 (2003).
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ty, we voluntarily refrain from doing so in order to reap the benefits of others forgoing such conduct as well. While this may be
true with respect to paying one's taxes and refraining from pricefixing, however, it hardly explains why we abstain from committing murder and rape. It seems very odd indeed to suggest that
the wrongfulness of rape or murder consists in taking an "unfair
advantage" over those who comply with the law. 46 In fact, as I
shall suggest below, such offenses are based on a different kind
of moral imperative entirely. Second, the theory seems more
suited to explaining why a tort system requires the defendant to
compensate the injured party. It is harder to see how it can explain the obligation of one convicted of crime to serve hard time
in prison. In cases where the injury is done to some individual
victim, it is not at all clear how criminal punishment is an appropriate means for restoring the equilibrium. 47 Third, to the
extent that the social contract theory relies on a monolithic conception of the social contract, it seems overly broad in its reach.
Society is deemed to be either just in the main, or it is not. If it is
not, then the contract is void, and the citizen owes no duty to
obey the law. Under this approach, it would seem not to matter
who was breaching the contract, or who was the victim of the
crime. Nor would it matter which laws were being violated. The
offender will be no more obliged to comply with the laws against
murder and assault than with those against theft and obstruction of justice. Indeed, in explaining how the broken contract
theory applies, Murphy himself offers the example of an impoverished and discriminated-against African-American man who
48
commits armed robbery.
D.

Nonjusticiability

Antony Duff has offered yet another approach to the problem
of imposing criminal sanctions on the severely impoverished and
politically excluded. 49 Duff is interested in what he calls the "preconditions" of punishment, the conditions that must be satisfied
46 Murphy himself recognized this and other problems with the theory in his later
writing. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, in Jeffrie G.
Murphy, ed, RetributionReconsidered: More Essays in the Philosophy of Law 31 (Kluwer
1992).
47 Odudu makes a similar point. Odudu, 16 Ratio Juris at 419 (cited in note 45)
(questioning how, under this theory of punishment, imprisonment and fines take away
the injury and compensate the real victim of the crime).
48 Murphy, 2 Phil & Pub Aff at 242 (cited in note 39).
49 R.A. Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community 181-201 (Oxford 2001).
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before a defendant can be tried in the first place (as opposed to
the conditions that must be satisfied before he can be justly convicted). He argues that one precondition of criminal punishment
is that the agent be bound by the laws under which she is to be
tried and punished. 50 Under this approach, people are bound by
the law only when they are treated as a responsible part of the
51
community.
Duff then considers the case of an offender who has been excluded from the community whose law she has violated. There
are three ways in which this exclusion might take place: First,
she is "excluded from participation in the political life of the
community, having no real chance to make [her voice] heard in
those fora in which the laws and policies under which" she must
live are decided. 52 Second, she has been "excluded from a fair
share in, or a fair opportunity to acquire, the economic and material benefits that others enjoy."53 And, third, she has been denied by the state and her fellow citizens the "respect and concern
54
due" to her as a citizen.
In each such case, he says, "there is reason to doubt whether
[the precondition of being bound by law] is adequately satisfied." 55 He is careful to explain that those who have been systematically excluded or unjustly disadvantaged are not necessarily
justified or excused in their criminal acts. Rather, his argument
is that such actors cannot properly be "called to account." 56 In
effect, he is arguing that such a case is nonjusticiable.
Duff's approach differs markedly from the first three considered. Unlike the necessity approach, there is no claim that the
impoverished offender's act is justified. Unlike the RSB approach, there is no claim that the defendant's act should be excused. And, unlike the broken-social-contract approach, there is
no claim that a citizen is relieved of his obligation to obey the
law. Indeed, what is striking about Duff's account is his lack of
concern with the moral status of the offender one way or the oth-

50 Id at 182.
51 Id at 183.
52

Id.

53 Duff, Punishment, Communication,and Community at 183 (cited in note 49).
54 Id.
55 Id at 183-84.
56 Id at 184-88. For a similar argument, see Victor Tadros, Poverty and Criminal
Responsibility, 43 J Value Inquiry 391, 393-94 (2009) (arguing that even if an unjustly
impoverished offender is responsible for her actions, society might not be entitled to hold
her responsible for her actions).
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er. Rather, his focus is on the moral status of society in judging
the offender.
So, exactly what are the implications of Duff's argument? It
is noteworthy that all of the "exclusion" scenarios he describes
involve impoverished defendants committing relatively minor,
economically driven offenses against relatively wealthy victims:
for example, he describes the case of an impoverished single parent stealing clothes from a supermarket for her children.5 7 But at
the same time, Duff properly recognizes that "if the law lacks the
standing to call the unjustly excluded to account, it lacks that
standing in relation to all crimes, including the most serious
mala in se."58 In other words, under Duff's approach, society
would have no more right to prosecute and punish an impoverished and excluded defendant who committed an aggravated
rape or first degree murder than it would to prosecute an impoverished defendant who committed a de minimis theft. Moreover,
it would seem to make no difference, in terms of society's right to
punish, whether the victim of D's crime was a wealthy member
of the ruling class, or was no less impoverished than D herself.
At one level, Duff's argument seems unassailable: if one accepts the premise that a society in which some are profoundly
disadvantaged lacks the moral authority ever to judge its citizens, then it follows that such authority will be lacking regardless of what kind of crime a given citizen has been accused of.
But is the premise valid? It seems to me that a society might well
have the moral status to make judgments in some cases but not
others. For example, even if a society with a profoundly unjust
division of property lacks the moral authority to make moral
judgments regarding certain property crimes, it might still retain
the moral authority to make moral judgments with respect to
crimes like murder and rape. Moreover, even if society did lack
the moral authority to pass judgment on one or more of its citizens with respect to all offenses, it would still be worth asking if
such citizens deserved blame to begin with. Indeed, if we assume
(as retributivists do) that moral blameworthiness is a prerequisite for just criminal punishment, the question of society's standing to judge would not even arise where the offender was determined to be blameless. It is to the issue of blameworthiness that
we therefore now turn.

57 Duff, Punishment,Communication, and Community at 182 (cited in note 49).
58 Id at 184 (emphasis in original).
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III. A CASE-SPECIFIC APPROACH TO
ASSESSING BLAMEWORTHINESS

My main criticism of the previously described attempts to
assess the culpability of severely disadvantaged offenders has
been that they are painted with too broad a brush. As an alternative to the four approaches just discussed, I now propose an approach that looks more narrowly at the specifics of the offender's
case.
A.

Kinds of Deprivation, Victim, and Offense

The approach developed here takes account of three variables in considering the crime committed: (1) the kind of unjust
deprivation, if any, to which the offender has been subjected; (2)
the kind of unfair advantage or disadvantage to which the victim
has been subjected; and (3) the particular offense committed.
Let us consider, first, the character of the offender's deprivation. So far in this Article we have focused primarily on the offender's poverty and economic disadvantage. But, as Duff recognizes, there are also other forms of disadvantage that may be
relevant, such as systematic exclusion from social and political
involvement, and failing to receive the "respect and concern" to
59
which one is presumably entitled.
What does it mean to live in a society in which one is unjustly denied basic social, political, or economic rights? Earlier, we
noted the difficulty of resolving such a contested question. I
promised to sidestep the issue and instead simply stipulate what
I assume to be clear and uncontroversial examples of disadvantage. I now offer three such cases:
Denial of property rights. D lives in a society which, as a result of the social caste into which he has been born, entirely denies him and others in his class (but not others) the right to own
property. 60 The fact that D is not merely without property, but is
legally barred from owning it allows us to avoid the possibility
that D is in some way to blame for his impoverishment. Nor do
59 Duff, Punishment,Communication, and Community at 183 (cited in note 49).
60 This is a situation that more or less appears to have been true of slaves in the
antebellum South (though for present purposes, we need not add the additional condition
that D is himself treated as another's property). See Dylan C. Penningroth, The Claims of
Kinfolk: African American Property and Community in the Nineteenth-Century South 45
(University of North Carolina 2003). Though, as Permingroth explains, slaves were often
able to participate in a substantial informal economy and thereby gradually accumulate
property. Id at 46.
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we need to worry about cases in which D voluntarily decides to
forgo property ownership, as in a commune. I take it that a legal
order that denied D property rights in this way would qualify as
unjust even if D's basic day-to-day needs were provided for.
Denial of political rights. The society in which D lives denies
him and others similarly situated, again as a result of social
caste, the basic rights of citizenship, such as the right to vote,
petition, express one's views, assemble, and receive due process
in court proceedings. Once again, by assuming that such disentitlements are imposed on D owing to his caste, we avoid the possibility that D is somehow to blame for his circumstances, as is
the case, say, where a felon is deprived of the right to vote as
part of his punishment.
Denial of right to basic state protections. D's society offers
him and others in his class few of the basic public safety protections that it offers others. For example, the police rarely respond
to emergency calls emanating from D's neighborhood, and they
routinely fail to investigate crimes occurring there; prosecutors
regularly fail to initiate prosecutions for crimes that occur in D's
part of town; and emergency medical services and fire crews are
slow to respond to emergencies that occur there. (D presumably
does still benefit from "public good" protections that necessarily
apply to society as a whole, such as military defense, clean air
and water regulations, and food and drug safety measures.)
Beginning with these "worst case" hypotheticals will allow
us to consider the means by which an offender's economic or social deprivation might bear on judgments of blameworthiness
without directly addressing the difficult normative and empirical
issues of what it means to live in a society that fails to give people what they deserve, and which, if any, societies in the world
today would qualify as economically or socially unjust.
It should be clear that these kinds of deprivation are by no
means mutually exclusive; indeed, they are mutually reinforcing
and closely interrelated. Those who are economically impoverished are often the same people who are politically marginalized
and deprived of basic state protections. Race plays a significant
role here. In the United States, members of minority groups often suffer the highest rates of unemployment and poverty, are
the most common targets of police harassment, experience the
most acute sense of political alienation, and are subject to the
highest rates of arrest and incarceration. 6 1 There is also a deeper
61 See generally Western, Punishmentand Inequality in America (cited in note 11).
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conceptual link between categories: The right to participate in
the political process, own property, receive basic police and
emergency protection, and have access to court processes can
each be meaningless, standing alone, unaccompanied by the other rights. For example, the right to property may be of little value unless it is backed up by due process rights in court. And the
right to speech may be essentially meaningless unless one has
access to basic means of communication necessary to express
oneself in the modern world.
The second variable concerns the economic, political, and social circumstances of the crime's victim (where the crime has an
identifiable victim). Here we will want to ask whether the victim
himself: (1) suffered unjust disadvantage; (2) benefited from unjust advantage; or (3) experienced neither unjust advantage nor
unjust disadvantage.
The final variable is the type of offense committed. For present purposes, I shall focus on three offense types: offenses
against the person (such as rape and murder), offenses against
the administration of justice (such as perjury and obstruction of
justice), and offenses against property (such as theft and criminal trespass). These categories are by no means meant to encompass all of the criminal law's Special Part. There are numerous
other offenses that do not fall clearly into any of these categories.
B.

The Offender's Blameworthiness

The goal here is to determine the extent to which an offender's social, economic, or political disadvantage affects his blameworthiness for committing various kinds of offenses. Before we
proceed, however, it is appropriate to say something briefly about
why we should care whether an offender's act is judged blameworthy in the first place. For present purposes, I shall assume
that it is intrinsically wrong for society to punish criminal offenders who are blameless (and also wrong to punish blameworthy offenders more harshly than they deserve). To talk this way
is to appeal to a familiar "negative" version of retributivism. The
claim, for present purposes, is not that we should punish the
blameworthy because they deserve it, but simply that we should
not punish those who are not blameworthy. In short, I intend to
rely on moral desert as a "side constraint" on whatever other ra-
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tionale we have for imposing criminal sanctions (such as some
version of consequentialism).6 2
To say that a criminal offender is at fault for violating a given law presupposes, at some level, that the law itself is just. Determining exactly what it means for a law to be just, however, is
another matter. We often ask what requirements must be satisfied in order for conduct to be properly criminalized. 63 But a law
that fails to satisfy such requirements is not necessarily unjust;
it may merely be unwise or imprudent. There may also be laws
that are just on their face but which are applied in an unjustly
selective or discriminatory manner.
For present purposes, we need not resolve these issues. Instead, let us consider laws that almost everyone would agree are
unjust: one is a law that made it a crime for blacks to sit at a
white lunch counter; another is a law that made it a crime for a
Jew to marry or have sexual relations with a gentile. Such laws
are unjust, I take it, because they further no legitimate interest
of the state and because they discriminate on the basis of morally
impermissible criteria, such as race, religion, and ethnic identity.
It is hard to imagine any circumstance in which the application
of such laws would be considered just. One who violated such
laws would have done nothing morally wrong and could not
properly be said to be at fault. The argument is not that the offender would be justified or excused in breaking the law, or that
society would be morally unjustified in bringing a prosecution
(though each of these claims is surely true), but rather that the
offender did not do an act that was blameworthy to begin with.
And because the offender was not at fault, it would be unjust,
from a retributive standpoint, to impose criminal penalties on
him.
The question that needs to be addressed is whether a similar
"lack of blameworthiness" would occur in other contexts involving laws that are not unjust on their face, but which might be
unjust as applied in the context of certain kinds of political, social, and economic circumstances. For reasons that will become
clearer as we proceed, I think it is reasonable to say that, in a
liberal social democracy which provided basic political and economic rights to all of its citizens, a person who committed each
kind of offense identified-that is, offenses against the person,
62 In so doing, I follow Duff and others. See Duff, Punishment, Communication, and
Community at 11-14 (cited in note 49).
63 See generally Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization:The Limits of the Criminal
Law (Oxford 2008).
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against public order and the administration of justice, and
against property-and had no excuse or justification for doing so,
would have done an act that was morally wrong and would deserve to be punished. The question is whether, with respect to
each type of offense, we would reach the same conclusion in cases
where the offender lived in a society in which he was denied
basic social, political, or economic rights.
C.

Offenses against the Person

Imagine that D commits a violent, non-defensive act of murder or rape or assault against a fellow citizen. Should the fact
that he has failed to receive what he deserves from society in
terms of economic, political, or social opportunities affect our
judgment about whether he deserves to be punished for his act?
Assuming that D's impoverishment and disenfranchisement
have not caused his criminal act to be excused or justified by
means of insanity, mistake, duress, or necessity, his impoverishment and disenfranchisement should not affect our judgment
of his culpability. The reason is that the moral underpinnings of
offenses such as murder and rape do not depend on background
considerations of social justice. Such offenses arise out of what
Rawls called "natural duties" (which are to be contrasted, as we
will see in a moment, to crimes like perjury and obstruction of
justice, which arise out of what he called "political obligation").
In Rawls's words:
[I]n contrast with obligations [like those derived in the
original position, natural duties] have no necessary connection with institutions or social practices; their content
is not, in general, defined by the rules of these arrangements. Thus we have a natural duty not to be cruel, and a
duty to help another, whether or not we have committed
ourselves to these actions. It is no defense or excuse to say
that we have made no promise not to be cruel or vindictive .... Indeed, a promise not to kill, for example, is
normally ludicrously redundant, and the suggestion that
it establishes a moral requirement where none already existed is mistaken.... A further feature of natural duties
is that they hold between persons irrespective of their in-
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stitutional relationships; they obtain between all as equal
64
moral persons.
In short, the moral obligations that D breaches when he commits
a violent offense against another person are obligations owed to
his fellow human beings, as individuals, rather than to the government or to society generally. We can recognize the special
sanctity of life and physical and sexual integrity, and therefore
the wrongfulness of murder, assault, and rape, without presup65
posing any developed institutional structure.
Should it matter which class the victim of D's crime is a
member of? Perhaps if V was also disadvantaged, we might think
that D would be guilty of exploiting V's vulnerability and that
D's act would therefore be more wrongful than it otherwise
would be. 66 On the other hand, if V was a member of the ruling
class that was responsible for D's unjust impoverishment or social disadvantage, it is hard to see why D's act should be regarded as any less wrongful than in a case in which V was neither
disadvantaged nor specially advantaged. There is nothing about
unjustly advantaged V's complicity in D's impoverishment or
disenfranchisement, wrongful as it is, that would invalidate V's
claim to life or bodily integrity. Even in those cases in which V
could have, but failed to, protect D from acts of violence directed
against him by others, D would not be justified in using violence
against V unless V himself posed a direct threat to D's physical
well-being.
D.

Offenses against Public Order and the Administration of
Justice

Imagine now that the offense committed by D is a nonviolent
offense against public order or the administration of justice, such
as obstruction of justice, bribery, or perjury. How would we judge
his blameworthiness with respect to these offenses, assuming

64 Rawls, A Theory of Justice at 114-15 (cited in note 40).

65 Regarding this point, Antony Duff has asked me what we should say about a legal
system that defined rape as intercourse with a woman without her husband's or parent's
consent. I would respond that such a crime would be so different from our modern understanding of rape that we should regard it as a distinct offense, one lacking the "natural
duty" background of rape defined as intercourse without the victim's consent.
66 I have previously considered the exploitative character of crimes against the vulnerable in Stuart P. Green, Looting Law, and Lawlessness, 81 Tulane L Rev 1129, 1147
(2007).
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again that D has failed to get what he deserves from society in
terms of economic, political, or social opportunities?
The moral content of such offenses is complex; I have dealt
with them at length elsewhere.6 7 At one level, such offenses seem
directed primarily at the government, or at the polity in whose
name and on whose behalf the government claims to act; at another level, they are directed at individual victims. An offender
who commits perjury or obstruction, for example, not only undermines the integrity of the judicial process but might also
cause significant harm to a litigant whose cause is damaged by
false testimony or destruction of documents. As for bribery, it
typically harms the integrity of the governmental process as well
as the constituents of the official who, in accepting the bribe, acted in his own self interest rather than in the public interest.
The fact that D has been denied the right to participate fully
in the political life of his community, or denied the police protections that are afforded other citizens, might, depending on its
precise context and purpose, mitigate, or even negate, the wrongfulness of his act in obstructing justice, committing perjury, or
paying a bribe. While D would still be engaging in what is arguably a wrongful act of deception or covering up, the wrongfulness
of that act would be potentially reduced by the circumstances in
which it occurred. Unlike murder, assault, and rape, which involve a violation of natural duties, obstruction of justice, perjury,
and bribery are precisely the sort of offense that involves a violation of political obligations. Their moral content is rooted in complex institutional practices involving a dense network of reciprocal duties. A defendant who commits such a crime has done a
blameworthy act only when he has an obligation to obey such
laws.
Our judgment of D's blameworthiness may also be affected
by the circumstances of his victim. If D committed perjury or obstruction of justice in litigation against a member of the ruling
elite who was in part responsible for creating a process that systematically favored people of his own class, we might think that
D would do nothing wrong in trying to "level the playing field"
through his unlawful acts. Our judgment would likely differ,
however, if D committed perjury or obstruction in litigation
against a similarly disempowered fellow citizen. Even though
neither D nor his disadvantaged victim would be part of the web
67 Stuart P. Green, Lying, Cheating, and Stealing: A Moral Theory of White-Collar
Crime (Oxford 2006).
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of political obligations that, I have argued, underlies the crime of
perjury and obstruction, D would nevertheless have derived some
benefit from that web, if only temporarily, and he would have
done so at the expense of a victim who was even more disempowered than he. As such, we should regard his act as a wrongful
one.
The fact that D has been denied the right to own property, by
contrast, seems to bear less directly on his culpability for such
offenses than his being denied the right to participate in the political process or receive basic protections from the state. Normally, there is no necessary connection between economic and
political rights. One can easily imagine cases in which D was unjustly impoverished without being unjustly disenfranchised and
unjustly disenfranchised without being unjustly impoverished.
(Though one can imagine circumstances in which D, whose stateimposed poverty makes it impossible for him to hire a lawyer,
and who is not otherwise provided with indigent counsel, uses
perjury or obstruction as a means of leveling the playing field.
Perhaps in such cases his impoverishment could be said to mitigate the blameworthiness of his act.)
E.

Offenses against Property

Finally, let us imagine that the crime D commits is not a violent offense against another's physical well-being, or an offense
against public order or the administration of justice, but is instead an offense against another's rights in property, such as
theft or fraud or criminal trespass. 68 How should we judge his
blameworthiness for these offenses, assuming again that D has
been denied the right to own property, to participate in the political life of his community, or to enjoy the basic public safety protections had by other citizens?
Here we need to examine the moral content that underlies
crimes against property.69 The essence of property offenses is
that they involve an offender's (wrongfully) causing harm to another's interests in, and rights to, property. 70 Property, in turn, is
68 My concern here is with property crimes of general application. I leave to the side
property crimes that are said to be aimed specifically at the poor. See generally Kaaryn
Gustafson, The Criminalizationof Poverty, 99 J Crim L & Criminol 643 (2009). See also
Barbara A. Hudson, Beyond ProportionatePunishment: Difficult Cases and the 1991
Criminal JusticeAct, 22 Crime, Law & Soc Change 59, 61-63 (1995).
69 This topic is dealt with in far more detail in my forthcoming book, tentatively titled
Thirteen Ways to Steal a Bicycle: Theft Law in the InformationAge.
70 Historically, this has not always been the case. As George Fletcher has argued, at
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best thought of not as a physical thing but as the bundle of rights
organized around the idea of securing, for the right of the holder,
exclusive use or access to, or control of, a thing.71 Control may
take various forms, including the right to exclude others, the privilege to use the property, the power to transfer it, and immunity
from having it taken from the owner or harmed without the own72
er's consent.
Crimes against property therefore involve harms to persons
in the sense that they involve harms to persons' interests in
property; and property, properly understood, concerns legal relations among people regarding the control and disposition of valued resources. While the term "crimes against property" may
provide a convenient shorthand, it is nonetheless more accurate
to speak of "crimes affecting persons' rights and interests in
property." 73 Such conduct is harmful because it undermines the
very reasons we have a system of property in the first placenamely, to facilitate the creation and preservation of wealth that
makes many forms of human endeavor possible.
On the continuum of offenses described by Rawls, ranging
from pure or nearly pure "natural duty" offenses like murder and
rape, at one end, to pure or nearly pure "political obligation" offenses like obstruction of justice and perjury, on the other, theft
lies somewhere in the middle, having attributes of both. While
we may recognize in some natural or pre-legal sense that it is
morally wrong to appropriate what "belongs" to another without
her permission, it is often impossible to make anything like a fully informed moral judgment about the blameworthiness of such
conduct until we know a good deal about what is meant by highly
legalized concepts such as property, ownership, possession, custody, title, contract, appropriation, fiduciary duty, and the like.
early common law, the law of larceny was intended primarily to protect society from manifest breaches of the peace, rather than to protect owners' property rights per se. See
George P. Fletcher, Rethinking CriminalLaw 31-39 (Little, Brown 1978).
71 For a useful discussion, see Joseph William Singer, Introduction to Property 2-3
(Aspen 2d ed 2005).
72 Tony Honor6 divides what he calls the "liberal concept of ownership" into a list of
components: the right to possess, use, and manage a thing; the right to income from its
use by others; the right to sell, give away, consume, modify, or destroy it; the power to
transmit it to the beneficiaries of one's estate; and the right to security from expropriation. A.M. Honor6, Ownership, in A.G. Guest, ed, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence107, 11224 (Oxford 1961).
73 With the possible, and interesting, exception of morals offenses such as prostitution and consensual bigamy, and perhaps a few other unusual offenses such as animal
cruelty, and possibly certain crimes against the environment, all crimes are crimes affecting persons' rights and interests-whether in their property or physical safety, in public
order, in the family, or elsewhere.
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Claims of property make sense only in a social context in
which there is some level of cooperative behavior. 74 Whether it is
wrong to violate a given law against theft, and whether it is
therefore just to be subjected to criminal penalties for doing so,
depends on whether the property regime within which such law
functions is itself just. This is very different from the violentcrimes-against-the-person paradigm we considered earlier because the set of norms on which the two kinds of offense are
based are different. As the late Jim Harris put it:
The background right [to property] is historically situated. It does not have the same ahistorical status as do
rights not to be subjected to unprovoked violence to the
person. There are no natural rights to full-blooded ownership of the world's resources.
Good faith implementation of the moral background right
may or may not achieve a threshold of justice for a property institution. If it does, the trespassory rules of the institution are, prima facie, morally binding. Murder, assault and rape are always moral wrongs. Theft is morally
75
wrong only when this justice threshold is attained.
And when does a given property institution achieve a threshold
of justice? That, of course, is an immensely complex and controversial question, one that lies beyond the scope of this Article.
For the moment, however, we can safely assume that the threshold would not be met by a regime under which a whole class of
citizens was legally forbidden from owning property. In such a
society, we should be able to say that D is not morally blameworthy for stealing property from V, where D was unjustly barred
from owning property, and V helped create or perpetuate the
76
conditions that caused D's unjust impoverishment.
The harder question arises in cases in which an unjustly impoverished offender steals from one who has not unjustly benefited from the system, including victims who are themselves unjustly impoverished. 77 (This supposes, for purposes of discussion,
74 For a useful discussion, see Carol M. Rose, The Moral Sense of Property,48 Wm &
Mary L Rev 1897, 1899 (2007).
75 J.W. Harris, Property and Justice 14 (Oxford 1996).
76 Compare with Tadros, 43 J Value Inquiry at 392 (cited in note 56) (suggesting that
a justification rationale applies only "to people who have less than their fair share of
wealth who take goods from people who have more than their fair share of wealth").
77 In fact, as noted above in note 10, a disproportionate percentage of the victims of
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that otherwise impoverished citizens were permitted to own certain limited types of property, or property of very low monetary
value.) An argument could be made that, unless a given law of
theft is enacted against a background of property laws that treat
D fairly, the law is simply not binding on D, and his stealing
would not be wrong. This approach seems inconsistent, however,
with our intuition that the impoverished victim has had what
few rights he possesses violated, and that it is D who is responsible for the violation. For this reason, I am inclined to say that D
should be viewed as nonculpable only when he steals from those
who are in some way complicit in causing his unjust impoverishment.
Finally, what about a thief who was denied not the right to
own property, but rather the right to participate in the political
process or the right to protection by the police? Here, there
should be no impediment to finding that D had done a blameworthy act. Such theftuous conduct would still undermine the system of property of which D was in some sense a beneficiary.
CONCLUSION
We end where we began, with the question of whether the
fact that a criminal offender lives in a society that denies him
what he deserves in terms of economic, social, or political rights
should affect the determination of what he deserves in terms of
punishment-a question that is all the more urgent given the
connection between the current economic recession and rising
rates of poverty. The answer offered here has been a qualified
yes, depending on the type of crime the offender has committed,
the type of deprivation to which he has been subjected, and the
circumstances of the crime victim. It should be clear, however,
that my analysis is intended as nothing more than a "first cut."
With so many variables, one can imagine an almost infinite
number of hypothetical situations. My goal has been not to resolve, or even spell out, all of these hypotheticals, but rather to

property crimes in the US are impoverished. Criminologists have offered various explanations for the peculiar fact that the very people with the least amount of property worth
stealing are the same people who are most likely to be the victims of theft. See, for example, Daniel Larsson, Exposure to Property Crime as a Consequence of Poverty, 7 J Scandinavian Stud in Criminol and Crim Prevention 45 (2006) (explaining that two reasons why
poor people are more exposed to property crime than those who are not poor are that they
live in neighborhoods with more crime and that they have fewer opportunities to keep
their property safe from crime).
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suggest the complexity of the problem and the error of thinking
that there is a one-size-fits-all solution.
By stipulating as to what would constitute serious cases of
distributive and political injustice, we have been able to avoid
some deeply contested issues in political theory. Still, the question remains whether, in the real world, we are in danger of imposing retributive penalties on offenders who, by virtue of their
social circumstances, should be regarded as blameless. The concern, I believe, is a legitimate one. While few societies in history
have ever distributed wealth equitably, the current disparity between rich and poor within the US and elsewhere seems particularly gross. The gap between the haves and have-nots is now
greater than at any time since 1929.78 In 1980, the poorest 20
percent of families in the US earned 4.2 percent of aggregate income, while the richest fifth received 44.1 percent; by 2008, the
share of the poorest 20 percent had dropped to 3.4 percent, while
the richest fifth's share had risen to 50 percent. 79 Viewed globally, the gap between rich and poor is even more dramatic: according to the most recent report of the World Institute for Development Economics Research, the richest 1 percent of adults alone
owned 40 percent of global assets in the year 2000, in contrast to
the bottom half of the world's adult population, which owned
barely 1 percent of global wealth.8 0 When we consider the fact
that a disproportionate share of crime, including crime against
property, is committed by offenders who are living in or near
poverty, together with the possibility that at least some of this
poverty, in at least some places in the world, is the result of unjust political and economic systems,8 1 the potential seriousness of
78 Edward N. Wolff, Top Heavy: A Study of the Increasing Inequality of Wealth in
America and What Can Be Done About It 2 (New Press 2d ed 2002).
79 See DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance,
Table A3 at 45-46 (cited in note 1). See also Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, Income
Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998, 118 Q J Econ 1 (2003).
80 James B. Davies, et al, United Nations University, The World Distribution of
Household Wealth, Discussion Paper No 2008/03, 7 (Feb 2008), online at http/
www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/discussion-papers/2008/eiGB/dp200803/_files/78918010772127840/default/dp2008-03.pdf (visited Oct 4, 2010).
81 In countries like Equatorial Guinea, Zambia, and Swaziland, where kleptocratic
leaders reportedly line their own pockets and leave their populations destitute, the injustice of the economic system arguably approaches that contained in the "worst case" hypotheticals described in the text. See generally Ian Urbina, Taint of Corruptionis No Barrier to U.S. Visa, NY Times (Nov 16, 2009), online at httpV/www.nytimes.com/2009/11/17/
us/17visa.htm1?_r=l&sq=africacorruptionpoverty&st=cse&adxnnl=l&scp=l&adxnnlx=12
58917716-aZzo8YcKMDy/qU5W4PJbeA (visited Oct 4, 2010) (discussing corruption in
Equatorial Guinea by Teodoro Nguema Obiang, the forest and agricultural minister and
son of the president, including extortion and theft of public funds); Barry Bearak, Living
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the problem begins to emerge. By imposing criminal sanctions on
arguably blameless offenders, we run the risk of compounding
the sins of distributive injustice with those of retributive
injustice.

Royally in Destitute Swaziland, NY Times Al (Sept 6, 2008) (discussing the king of Swaziland's excessive spending and income while two-thirds of the country lives in poverty
and corruption bleeds the treasury); Celia W. Dugger, Ex-Zambian Leader's High Life
Awaits a Verdict, NY Times A4 (June 22, 2009) (discussing Frederick Chiluba, the former
president of Zambia, who was on trial for stealing about $500,000).

